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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
D - - - p - - - - -,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
SOCIAL SERVICE AND CHILD WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF THE RELIEF SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD
ASSOCIATION OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER - DAY
SAINTS,

Case No.
10892

Defendant and Respondent.

DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
This appeal was from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
The Honorable Leonard H. Elton, District Judge.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Respondent Social Service and Child Welfare Department of the Relief Society General Board Association of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints respectfully
petitions this court for rehearing in the above entitled cause
and alleges that the court in its majority opinion erred on
the following points:
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POINT ONE
THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRED IN ITS
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT -------------------------------------------------------------- 4
POINT TWO
THIS COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE
TRIAL COURT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD AND IN ORDERING COMPLIANCE BY PERSONS NOT PARTY TO THIS
PROCEEDING WHO MAY HA VE THE FOREGOING OR OTHER INDEPENDENT ISSUES
TO RAISE AND WHO HAVE NOT HAD
"THEIR DAY I NCOURT" ------------------------------------------ 7
POINT THREE
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER
SHOULD BE OBTAINED AS SOON AFTER
BIRTH AS POSSIBLE __________________________________________________ 13
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY,
WHICH POLICY WOULD UPHOLD AGENCY
PLACEMENT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE ________________________________________________________________________________ 19
Respondent, recognizing the emotional and social consequences of this case further petitions the court, in granting this motion to set the same for argument at an early
date.
WHEREFORE, Defendant and Respondent prays that
this action be reheard by this Honorable Court, that such
rehearing be scheduled for an early setting and that the
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foregoing errors of the court be corrected in the interest of
law and justice.
EARLS. SPAFFORD
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION OF THIS COURT ON ORIGINAL HEARING
This is a case involving an attempted rescission by a
natural mother of her consent to an adoption. The proceeding was in Habeas Corpus. The trial court denied the Writ.
The Supreme Court by a 3 to 2 decision reversed the Trial
Court and ordered a return of the child. Justice Henroid
wrote the majority opinion. Justice Tuckett and Justice
Callister concurre\l( Justice Ellett and Chief Justice Crockett
dissented.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND INTRODUCTION
The facts set forth in Respondent's Brief on appeal
and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Ellett and Chief
Justice Crockett accurately reflect the records and will be
referred to in the following arguments:

4

While it is not the Respondent's intent to ask the Court
to merely reconsider those points which have been previously
fully considered, the Respondent does not agree with the
Court's holding and rationale as expressed in the majority
opinion and desires to suggest certain facts which the majority opinion in our judgment seemingly overlooked. It
appears to Respondent that the majority failed to treat and
apparently failed to consider certain controlling principles
urged by Defendants in its original brief herein and certain
matters of law which have been binding upon this court
under the doctrine of stare decisis.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court's findings were made after hearing
sharply conflicting testimony. For example, Dana Phelps
testified that Mrs. Stewart told her the consent would be
obtained two or three days after birth to assure that the
mother was not under the influence of narcotics or anasthesia. (Tr. p. 20). Mrs. Stewart testified that she told
Dana Phelps she would ordinarily obtain the consent the
day after the delivery. (Tr. p. 69). Dana Phelps testified she
did not recall a telephone call from Mrs. Stewart about coming to the hospital for the consent. (Tr. p. 18 and 27). Mrs.
Stewart testified that she called Dana Phelps on December
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17, 1966, to say that she was coming for the consent on December 18, 1966 and Dana Phelps said "fine." (Tr. p. 63).
Dana Phelps testified she did not discuss other counseling
services with Mrs. Stewart. (Tr. p. 25-26). Mrs. Stewart
testified that Dana Phelps refused counseling. (Tr. 62).
Dana Phelps testified that she never intended to place the
baby for adoption. (Tr. 24). Mrs. Stewart (Tr. p. 72-73),
Mrs. Bridgewater (Tr. p. 112, 118-119), and Dr. Hebertson
(Tr. p. 77), testified that Dana Phelps, expressly decided on
adoption. Barbara Phelps and William Phelps testified
generally that Dana Phelps was crying and not coherent the
day following the delivery. Mrs. Stewart, Dr. Hebertson
and Mrs. J erominski testified generally that Dana Phelps
was not continually crying and was quite coherent the day
after the delivery. Dr. Clark testified generally that Dana
Phelps' decision-making capacity was impaired the day following delivery from various factors including sleep deprivation and narcotics. Dr. Hebertson testified Dana
Phelps did not have unusual reaction to narcotics and the
impact of the small dose was over in two hours; further that
she suffered no sleep deprivation and was competent to
make a decision the day following the delivery. The point
should not be belabored. The evidence was in sharp conflict.
Recognizing the obligation of Utah Constitution, article
VIII, sec. 9 and URCP 72 (a) to review questions of fact and
law in equity cases, this Court's decision is a dramatic departure from the long established principles for appellate
review of equity cases. The equity practice of hearing de
novo on appeal arose from the English Chancery practice of
hearing equity cases on depositions. The shift to the trial
to the court on oral evidence, with the consequent advantage
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to the trial court in making factual determinations, resulted

in a change in the equity practice of review. Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, pp. 300-302 (1941). The
change in practice was reflected early by this Court.
This court has frequently held that even on appeals in equity cases notwithstanding both questions
of law and facts are subject to review, the findings
of the trial court will not be set aside when the evidence is conflicting, unless the evidence is clearly
insufficient. Wright v. Union Pa.cific R. Co. 22 Utah
338, 344-4, 62 P. 317 (1900.)
This principle has been applied time and again by this
court. Beesley v. Boa.rclma.n 50 Utah 149,, 166 P. 991 (1917);
Sta.nley v. Sta.nley 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 ( 1939) ; Shaw
v. Jeppson 121 Utah 155, 239 P. 2d 745 (1952) ; Lawler v.
Lawler 121Utah201, 240 P. 2d 271 (1952) and McMahon v.
Ta.nner 122 Utah 333, 249 P. 2d 502 (1952) are a few of the
many decisions reiterating this principle. It has likewise
been applied to cases of the precise kind before this Court.
Walton v. Koffman 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97 (1946) and
Wilson v. Pierce 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 925 (1963).
The majority of this Court has said, "I am not impressed in this case with the rather worn cliche about the
trial court being in a better position to determine weight and
credibility and that we should not substitute our judgment
for his unless we are convinced he made improper findings.
There is just as valid a rule to the effect that we must do
our own weighing and find our own facts in an equity case
like this ... " The "just as valid a rule" which this Court
applies is the old English Chancery rule applicable to cases
hear9 on deposition.

7

"On a motion for a new trial, supported and resistetl, as in the case at bar, on ex Parte affidavits,
those making the affidavits are not subject to crossexamination, and not being before the trial judge, his
opportunity to judge of their credibility, and the
weight of their statements, is not better than the
appellate court. In all such cases and in equity cases
where the evidence consists exclusively of depositions, the reason upon which the decisions quoted are
based fails, and the rule established by them has no
application to such cases. Wright v. Union Pacific R.
Co. supra at p. 345 (emphasis supplied).
Where the evidence is in conflict and credibility and.
demeanor testimony is involved, the appellate court in an
equity case will defer the primary inferences to be drawn
from demeanor testimony to the trial court. 5 Moore's Federal Practice para. 52.03 (1). That principle is now rejected
by this Court in favor of a de novo review standard applicable to documentary and non-demeanor testimony but never
applied to a trial by oral testimony. This Court has now
reduced the equity trial court to a mere fact gatherer. Respondent respectfully urges this Court to withdraw its
opinion and continue the sound practice of 100 years.
POINT TWO
THIS COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL
COURT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION OF
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AND IN ORDERING COMPLIANCE BY PERSONS NOT PARTY TO
THIS PROCEEDING WHO MAY HAVE THE FOREGOING OR OTHER INDEPENDENT ISSUES TO RAISE
AND WHO HAVE NOT HAD "THEIR DAY IN COURT."
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The proceeding before the Court arises on petition for
Habeas Corpus to determine custody of an infant. As J ustice Crockett points out in his dissenting opinion, and even
Appellant urges in her brief (Brief for Appellant pp. 39-40),
the paramount concern is the welfare and happiness of the
child. It has always been recognized by courts of equity that
on questions of custody the interest of the child comes first
and the interest of the parent comes second. The principle
has reached the status of a truism and elaborate citation
would simply be pedantic. 43 CJS Infants sec. 7 ; 27 Am.
Jur. Infants sec. 108. Yet this Court gives virtually no consideration to what is the best interest of the child. This
Court simply concludes that Appellant is "presumtively" a
"chaste, employed, moral, Christian young woman." The
Court apparently accepts the approach of the Appellant
(Brief for Appellant p. 40) that in the absence of evidence
rebutting the presumption in favor of the natural parent,
the issue is resolved that the best interest of the child is to
be reared by the natural parent. The question is not simply
whether the natural mother is "loose, promiscuous or a
lady of the pavements." Previously this Court has said,
"Nevertheless, when questions of child custody
arise, the welfare of the child and her chances for a
suitable home environment and advantages in nurture, training and education to the end that she may
live and be conditioned for a well adjusted, happy
and useful life are important factors to consider."
In Re Adoption of D - - - 122 Utah 525, 252 P. 2d
223 (1953}.
The issue of the child's welfare is too vital to be resolved by the procedural technicalities useful for disputes
over chattels or promissory notes.
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Dr. Hebertson's opinion that Appellant would be a
"competent mother" (Tr. pp. 36, 92) is not an adequate
determination of the best interest of the child. This paramount issue can only be determined with the presence and
participation of the other parties in interest, the parents
who have nurtured the child since birth. Appellant did not
include them as parties to her action and made no effort to
pursue the issue on trial. Appellant's easy answer (Brief for
Appellant pp. 7-8) is that Respondent knows the names of
the parents so Respondent should produce them. As this
Court knows, however, Respondent is prohibited from disclosure of the names of the parents by regulations of the
Utah Department of Welfare which controls Respondent's
· license. Regulation of the Department of Public Welfare,
Private Child Placing Agencies, Licensing and Inspection,
secs. 7411-7413. The power of forcing disclosure is not with
Respondent, but with the Appellant.
The law as it relates to jurisdiction of parties is fully
resolved and need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that no
court has jurisdiction over a party unless such party has
submitted to such jurisdiction, otherwise waived service of
process, or unless process has been served upon him. 20 Am.
Jur. 2d 465. It has been held that it is the very essence of
due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, that power to hear and
determine a controversy in personam is not vested in a court
if it has not jurisdiction over the parties. James H. Rhodes
& Co. v. Chansovsky 137 NJL 459, 60 A. 2d 623.
Our rules of procedure provide the mechanics by which
the adopted parents could have been made party hereto. We
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respectfully submit that these persons should be afforded
their "day in court."
One example of a vital issue neglected in this proceeding is the impact on the child of separation from the only
parents it knows. Appellant's only expression on the subject
is the euphemistic reference on page 32 of her brief that no
"vested rights" have intervened. Consider the recent case
of In Re Adoption of Richardson 59 Cal. Rotr. 323 (1967)
wherein the California Court of Appeals reversed the refusal of the trial court to allow deaf-mute parents to adopt
the child in question. The testimony on the impact on the
nine month old child of separation from the only parents it
knew is significant to this case. Dr. Arthur H. Parmelee, Jr.,
Director of the Pediatrics Clinic at the University of California at Los Angeles, stated, supra p. 329:
"Disruption of the continuity of care of this
baby at his present age is critical and could be permanently damaging to him. It is well known that
babies manifest their greatest anxiety over separation from their parents in the age period of eight
months to two years. This little boy is now being
separated from the only parents he knows. He will
go into a temporary foster home where he will try
to make new attachments. Then he will be placed in
a new home and the emotional separation from his
foster home will take place. This sequence of events
in this age period can be devastating to the development of healthy emotional attachments to people for
the remainder of this child's life." (Emphasis in
original).
The child's pediatrician, Dr. Neil N. Litman stated, supra
p. 329:
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" . . . ; the child being very sensitive at age nine
months has received a real shock in being removed
from this relationship and if this condition persists,
will undoubtedly receive a shock to its nervous and
emotional development of a high order." (Emphasis
in original).
The consequence of separation from the parents who have
nurtured the baby at issue in the case at bar is common
knowledge to men of medicine. Anna Freud, Normality and
Pathology in Childhood, International Univ. Press (1965);
Winnicott, The Ordinary Devoted Mother and Her Baby,
Tavistock Puhl. (1949) ; James, "Premature Ego Development; Sqme Observations Upon Disturbances in the First
Three Years of Life," 41 International Jour. of Psychoanalysis 228 (1960); Anna Freud and D. Burlingham, War and
Children, International Univ. Press (1943); Anna Freud
and D. Burlingham, Infants without Families, International
Univ. Press (1944); Bowlby, "A Two Year Old to Hospital"
7 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 82 (1952) ; Spitz, Anaclitic Depression" 2 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 313
(1946) and Bowlby, "Grief and Mourning in Infancy and
Early Childhood" 15 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 9
(1960); Robertson, Young Children in the Hospital, Tavistock Puhl. (1958) ; Spitz, "Hospitalization" 1 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 53 (1945).
General rules of medical experience are still not a substitute for concrete evidence on the emotional development
of the particular child in question. Yet legal decisions of the
kind before the court cannot be made in ignorance of the
learning of other professions intimately involved in the legal
issues this Court must decide. The issue of the child's best
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interest cannot be made by default where the essential information is missing because the parties necessary to a full
determination are within the control of Appellant and beyond the control of Respondent. The gap in evidence cannot
be filled in cases of this kind by the breezy presumption that
the child's best interest will be served with the natural
mother in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Indeed
this Court has suggested that the burden is on the natural
parents to show that the welfare of the child requires the
annulment of a previous transfer and the return of custody
to the natural parent. Stanford v. Gray 42 Utah 228, 129 P.
423 (1912). In any event, we reiterate such matter cannot
be determined without evidence.
Finally, Respondent urges this Court to clarify a present ambiguity in the law of this State regarding the application of the best interest of the child principle. It is clear
that in the case at bar, an issue of custody arising on petition for Habeas Corpus, that the best interest of the child is
the paramount concern. Walton v. Koffman 110 Utah l,
169 P. 2d 97 (1946) and Taylor v. Waddoups 121 Utah 279,
241 P. 2d 157 (1952). What would have been the situations
if Appellant's position had been asserted as an objection to
an adoption petition as distinguished from a custody dispute
as is the case at bar? The law on such a question is unclear.
Two prior decisions, In Re Adoption of Walton, 123 Utah
380, 259 P. 2d 881 (1953) and Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown
2 Utah 2d 30, 268 P. 2d 995 (1954), suggest that in an adoption proceeding, the court cannot consider the best interest
of the child until the court has first determined that the
natural parent has abandoned the child, as in Re Adoption
of Walton, or the parental rights have been terminated as

in Deveraux' Adoption vs. Brown. Yet in Wilson v. Pierce
14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 925 (1963), another adoption proceeding where the natural parent claimed no abandonment,
this Court indicated that the best interest of the child is the
primary concern. And in Re Adoption of D - - - 122 Utah
525, 252 P. 2d 229 (1953), wherein the natural mother
sought to revoke consent in an adoption proceeding, the
Court applies the best interest of the child principle.
The question is not necessary to the determination of
the case at bar because it is a custody case on Habeas Corpus
where all agree that the best interest of the child is paramount, and not an adoption proceeding. The question is
likely to arise in an adoption. The Court's opinion, however,
moves on the presumption that the best interests of the child
Ii~ in the return of custody to the natural mother with no
basis in the record upon which such presumptive determination can be made. Should the trial court hear evidence on
the best interest of the child in accord with Wilson v. Pierce
and in Re Adoption of D - - - or reject the evidence as suggested in In Re Adoption of Walton and Deveraux' Adoption
v. Brown? Respondent urges this Court to resolve the question in favor of the position of Wilson v. Pierce and In Re
Adoption of D - - -. As the case at bar makes clear, failure to
do so will result in determination of only part of the issues.
Of course the court cannot permit the adoption of a child
over the objection of the natural parent simply because
some may feel that the child will have a brighter future in
some other home. But neither can the court divorce the issue
of custody from the adoption proceeding. In Re Adoption
of Walton and Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown, does just
that. The custodial issue of the child's best interest is just
as vital a question as the adoption issue of terminating
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the natural parent's rights. The approach of Wilson v.
Pierce and In Re Adoption of D - - - is the sounder approach
as including consideration of all of the issues involved and
should be clarified as the law of this jurisdiction.
POINT THREE
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER
SHOULD BE OBTAINED AS SOON AFTER BIRTH AS
POSSIBLE.
Mrs. Stewart testified that it was normal agency practice to obtain the consent of the natural mother the day
after delivery. (Tr. 69-70). The majority of this Court
would characterize this practice as a tawdry attempt to
snatch the child from the mother with unreasoning haste.
Yet as recently as 1961, this Court faced a claim of duress
in consenting to adoption by an unmarried mother where
the consent was obtained the day following delivery. The
claim was rejected summarily. Thomas v. Children's Aid
Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961).
The customary agency practice reflected in the case at
bar is not a hasty and conniving plot to deprive the natural
mother of her child while her wits are confused. The practice reflects the agency's experience with the emotional
conflicts which plague any mother in the unfortunate position of Appellant. This Court appeals for a reasonable
length of time on the apparently logical assumption that
time will enable the mother to reach a reasoned rather than
an emotional decision. But the decision to give up a child is
never emotionally neutral no matter when it is made. By
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well-intentioned use of a priori reasoning, this Court has
chosen the seemingly logical conclusion that the mother's
decision, even if not emotion free, will be more realistic and
deliberate if made some time after the pain and emotional
turmoil of birth is past. But one of our greatest justices,
Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized, "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience." Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881). The experience of the experts in social
work and psychiatry is that time is the greatest enemy and
not the friend of the mother in this predicament. The deliberated decision before birth that the natural mother cannot
provide for the full welfare of the child becomes twisted
with doubts apd conflicts in the emotional turmoil after
birth. For example, Dr. Ner Littner, in his discussion of
the paper "A Program of Adoptive Placements For Infants
Under Three Months" by Fradkin and Krugman, states, 26
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 577, 591 (1956) says:
"The first problem is the ability of the natural
mother to relinquish her child completely at birth.
The results of the excellent casework reported on in
this paper confirm what we already know about natural mothers; namely, that where adoption is indicated, both the mother and her child are far better
off emotionally if she gives up her child as soon after
birth as possible. The best way to help her reach such
a firm conclusion is to provide her with active and
intensive casework help as early in her pregnancy as
possible." (Emphasis in original).
Further, Leontine Young, Professor in Casework,
School of Social Administration, Ohio State University,
states in her study, Out of Wedlock - A Study of the Problems of the Unmarried Mother and Her Child. (New York
1954) :
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What has not always been seen so clearly is that
for many unmarried mothers early surrenders are
helpful and often important. No thinking person
would assume that this is invariably so or that this
should be ipso facto a general rule. The fact remains
that girls who have had and used help in making a
decision and in facing their own feelings about this
decision before the birth of the baby are rarely
helped and are frequently damaged by a waiting period of any duration in executing that decision after
the baby's birth. This is particularly true of the
neurotic girl, who has great difficulty in sustaining
any decision for long. Frequently the adoption agency and the worker are strange to her; and her ties
with the previous worker who has helped her in the
past are weakened by the change, by the fact that
the adoption agency now has the baby under care
and must complete the arrangements directly with
her, and by her greater inaccessibility as she returns
to active living in the community. Over and over
these girls use this waiting period only to review and
relive all the questions and problems which had been
relieved by their original decision. Again they are
harassed by the same doubts and conflicts, grown
now even more confusing and difficult, since they are
less protected. They are not free to look to the future
or to consider their own plans and actions, bound as
they are to the treadmill of this imminent decision.
Occasionally it has been mistakenly supposed
that this very confusion was proof of their need for
more time. That this is not the fact can be seen in
the compulsive, phonograph-like repetition of their
doubts and fears, which nothing but action can terminate and which nothing but an analysis of their basic personality problems could resolve. It is actually
an agonizing and damaging experience for them, as
some of the more discerning girls have pointed out
directly. Objectively no decision can be said to have
been made until it is acted upon. Until girls as in-
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ternally divided as this have acted upon a decision,
they can never be free of the tortuous questions that
went into its making. Most of them in the end return
to their original decision, but tragically, a few of
them revert to the hopelessly unrealistic plans with
wh~ch they began. By the time life has taught them
just how unrealistic those plans were, it is usually
too late to help either girl or baby. On the whole any
girl who has made a clear, thoughtful, and realistic
decision before the baby is born is helped by an early
surrender and is spared unnecessary suffering. One
girl who had surrendered her baby directly from the
hospital remarked, "I didn't know until I saw other
girls who have had to wait how lucky I was and how
much I was spared."
... This same attitude has also created a good
deal of confusion as to the final validity of surrenders. This is primarily a legal question, and there is
urgent need of a clear, uniform legal definition of
the effectiveness and finality of the surrender itself.
Lack of such a definition has resulted in some tragic
situations and a lack of security for everyone involved. On the one hand it has left a convenient loophole for the occasional psychopathic girl who wishes
to take her baby back because a change in circumstances has indicated a way in which he could be of
use to her. In the absence of clear safeguards she can
accuse an agency of undue pressure despite the fact
that her decision was freely made. The popular appeal of such a situation, where the actual facts are
difficult to prove, cannot be underestimated. It can
result in disaster for the child and the adoptive parents and in serious trouble for the agency. That same
girl may later place her baby privately, but the public rarely knows about that. (P. 161-164)
See also, Heller, "Applications by Married Parents for
Adoptive Placement of Their In-Wedlock Children," XLV
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Child Welfare 404 ( 1966) ; Gallagher, "The Professions'
Roles In Serving the Unmarried Mother and her Baby" Address to the National Conference of Social Welfare, Chicago,
Illinois, May 13, 1958, available through Children's Bureau
of the United States Department of Health, Education and
Welfare.
Of course Respondent does not urge this Court to abdicate its obligation to determine legal policy to the social
workers and psychiatrists. Respondent does urge that this
Court consider the accumulated experience of other disciplines as it directly bears upon the legal issues facing this
Court. Re-examination of the record in the light of the common knowledge of the social workers and psychiatrists, if
uncommon knowledge to lawyers, reveals that what was
done in this case was the soundest of social work practice.
The Appellant sought counsel and advice was given it. In a
more deliberate and realistic state during her pregnancy,
Appellant realized that keeping the baby would only be
destructive of her own and her baby's future welfare. Having decided to relinquish the child before birth, Appellant
was plagued with doubt and conflict about her resolve after
birth. Mrs. Stewart, knowing by training and experience
that the emotional turmoil of birth would begin to raise
doubts and conflicts in the mind of Appellant, sought the
formal signing of the consent as soon after birth as possible.
This Court has now completely disregarded the findings of
the trial court and announced a legal policy that is the very
antithesis of the practice advocated by the psychiatrists and
the social workers; the professions who must deal with the
mother as a human problem and not an abstract legal issue.
This Court now requires that the mother must wait until
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she has undoubtedly seen and held her baby before formal
consent can be obtained. However reasonable intuitive reasoning may make a waiting time appear, those who must
work day-to-day with the unwed mother recognize that
nothing could be more destructive of the goal the law seeks
to attain, the best interest of the child.

POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
ESTABLISHED POLICY, WHICH POLICY WOULD UPHOLD AGENCY PLACEMENT UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
Consider first the words of Justice Henroid in his declaration of policy in the case of Jacob vs. State by and
through Public Welfare Commission, 7 Utah 2d 304, 322 P.
2d 720:
The policy of the law is ... "to allay the fears of
prospective adoptive parents, and to encourage willing persons to give underprivileged children an opportunity in life through adoption, that they would
otherwise be denied,-without a constant fear that
the adoption of a child would be fractured."
While the facts in the Jacob case are in a measure dissimilar
to those at bar the underlying principles remain the same.
Justice Crockett stated the policy in this fashion:
"Public policy favors the adoption of children who
are left without parental refuge. Once a child has
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been cast adrift and is without responsible parental
care, the policy of the law should be to assist in every
way in establishing a satisfactory parent/child and
family relationship. Adoptive parents should not be
discouraged by a construction of the law which
would cause them to fear the consequences of accepting a child because of the knowledge that the fate of
their efforts would be at the will of the natural parents." In Re Adoption of D - - - 122 Utah 525, 252 P.
2d 229.
Justice Ellett in the case at bar in his dissenting opinion states the policy thusly:
"If it be decided that a parent can revoke a consent

at any time before final adoption, great mischief
will be done to the efforts made by child placing agencies and to parents who wish to adopt children. It
is not conducive to a good relationship for parents to
be on tenterhooks for a year or more, fearing to
bestow their love and affection upon the baby lest
they have it all snatched away by a natural parent
who may have a change of mind. Such a holding
would really open the door to a shakedown in case
the adoptive parents let their natural love go to the
child, for they would pay any sum possible to retain
their child. If, on the other hand, they kept the child
as a boarder until final adoption was had, the child
would not be able to receive the love and affection
which it so much needs for its proper development in
the beginning of its life." (Emphasis in original)
This policy was restated by the Utah Legislature in its
enactment of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Section 55-10-42 which provides:
"No parent or guardian or other person who by in·
strument in writing surrenders or has surrendered
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heretofore the custody of a child to any aid society
or institution shall thereafter contrary to the terms
of such instrument be entitled to custody or control
or authority over or any right to interfere with any
such child and the same conditions shall prevail
where the child is or has been delivered to a children's aid society or institution by action of any
proper court."
The foregoing statute was a declaration of Utah public policy and has been cited numerous times in support of our
case law. Its repeal was inadvertent and regrettable, but
must not be construed as a repudiation of the established
policy of this state. The court will recall that the repeal was
a perfunctory act incident to a blanket revision of administrative practices in the Juvenile Court. In 1965 some 62
sections of the Juvenile Court Act were repealed.
In Respondent's brief on appeal we pointed out the
amendment in 1965 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section
78-30-4 to establish as irrevokable the consent of a minor
mother to an agency placement. This quite obviously evidences the real intent of the legislature to not change, but
to strengthen, previously established policy in the law.

We urge upon the court a re-consideration of Respondent's argument as presented in point five of Respondent's
brief on appeal but not touched upon in the majority
opinion.
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CONCLUSION
The issues which were presented to the court on appeal
reduce themselves logically to a syllogism with a major and
minor premise leading to an apparent conclusion.
1. Major Premise: An unwed natural mother who ex-

ecutes a document of consent to adoption while suffering
with such impairment as to make her act involuntary has
not in fact legally consented at all.
2. Minor Premise: Dana Phelps did not (or did) in fact
consent to the placement of her child with Respondent for
purposes of adoption.
3. Conclusion: Dana Phelps can (or cannot) rescind her
consent.
ln analysing the validity of the foregoing syllogism we
invite the Court to re-examine in depth the record of this
case. A further careful perusal of the evidence will clearly
demonstrate the fact that the minor premise to be supported
by the record must uphold the validity of the consent. Obviously Appellant has no quarrel with the major premise
and the minor premise and conclusion resolve themselves to
questions of fact.
It cannot be overlooked that the testimony of Appellant's witness, Dr. Clark, was based upon a statement of hypothetical facts which the trial court found unsubstantiated.
Consider this testimony of Dr. Clark:
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Question: Would it have been difficult for Miss Phelps
to make a decision such as signing a consent in the state of
mind that you feel she was in?
Answer: I can't quite answer your question in terms of
would it be difficult for her. (Tr. 49, lines 17 to 21.)
Question: Is the fact, if this is the fact, that there was
some organic impairment sufficient for you to conclude that
she was completely incompetent to comprehend what she
was doing or signing?
Answer: I can't answer regarding the degree of competency that she might have in coping with specific types of
problems presented to her. (Tr. 52, line 30, Tr. 53, lines 1
to 6.)
The testimony of Respondent's witnesses, all responsible, professional persons who had opportunity to observe
her reactions at the time in question, generally and specifically sustain the fact of competency.
It must be remembered that Dana Phelps came to the
agency of her own volition for a specific service. The very
qualities ascribed to her, with the possible exception of
"chaste," led the agency to believe that she had the wisdom
to decide things for herself. She asked specifically for placement of her child and was fully determined in the course she
desired to follow. Her confidants were fully supportive of
her in her decision and assisted in the mechanics of placement. The visit on December 18, was by prior mutual agree-
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ment by telephone and at Dana's request with the expressed
wish of having the baby placed before Christmas. Accordingly, the baby was placed December 22, 1966. Early placement-yes. Hasty action-indeed not.
We urge upon the court the singular import of its decision upon the field of Social Welfare Law and the importance of sustaining the declared public policy of this Court
in the interest of the child. Social Welfare Law is a rapidly
advancing field of endeavor. The time has arrived for the
legal profession to create legal policy outside the vacuum of
its own discipline, and to look to the accumulated experience
and knowledge of the laws allied fields, that of sociology and
medicine. The experience of both of those professions teach
that mother and child are saved needless anguish by sound
counseling during pregnancy, and if a decision is reached to
give up the child then, taking the child as soon after birth
as possible. A fortiori, the interests of the natural mother
are promoted by establishing finality to her decisions and
act of consent.
We appeal to the court in the interest of sound legal
practice and upon precepts of justice to uphold the sound
agency practice evident here, deal squarely with the issue
of jurisdiction as it pertains to the adoptive parents, reverse
its previous holdings herein, declare anew stated public policy and resolve the ambiguities that permeate this problem.
Respondent, together with other licensed agencies,
adoptive applicants, needful children, and applicants for
social service view with alarm the impact of the court's
prior decision. If no security in placements can be assured
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adopting parents, a great disservice will be done to all
parties involved.
We respectfully and sincerely request a reconsideration
and reversal of the majority opinion as heretofore expressed.
Respectfully submitted,
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Earl S. Spafford

